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This article will examine Ottoman and 
British diplomatic correspondence and 
the satirical press and argue that during 
the Eastern Crisis of 1875-78, representa-
tives of the Great Powers conceived of a 
hierarchy of masculinities that became a 
major part of their diplomatic rhetoric. At 
the top of this order was the masculinity 
that European statesmen saw in them-
selves and legitimized their imperialist 
projects; they particularly emphasized 
honor, and ascribed what they viewed as 
positive governmental traits – such as 
safety, order, rational thinking, and secu-
larism – as masculine and civilized and 
their opposites as feminine and barba-
rous. Until the end of this crisis, Ottoman 
officials sought to convince their 
European counterparts that they should 
accept them with honor and dignity, and 
therefore a qualified equality. Thus, 
Ottomans did not challenge the European 
belief in a hierarchy of masculinities but 
sought instead to prove that the new 
Ottoman statesman was himself properly 
masculine and had the moral imperative 
to rule over the lesser peoples of the 
Ottoman Empire. In particular, Ottoman 
officials depicted Christian separatists as 
cruel, savage, and too ignorant for inde-
pendence, mirroring the gendered argu-
ments that anti-Ottoman Europeans 
made about the Ottomans.
Keywords: Ottoman diplomacy, Eastern 
Question, masculinity
In the historiography of The Great Eastern 
Crisis of 1875-1878, both gender and the 
Ottoman perspective in diplomatic histo-
ries are underdeveloped. Most older 
works do not even problematize the cen-
tering of the Great Powers (Austria-
Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, and Russia). Instead, despite the 
Eastern Question directly concerning 
Ottoman lands and peoples, these histo-
rians ignored Ottoman concerns and 
reduced Ottoman officials to mere parti-
sans of a Great Power (see Harris, Marriott, 
Millman), rather than statesmen with com-
peting beliefs on the best diplomatic alli-
ances for safeguarding Ottoman indepen-
dence. 
There are exceptions to this within the 
Ottoman field, such as the edited volumes 
on the Ottoman-Russian war (Yavuz and 
Sluglett, Turan), F.A.K. Yasamee’s book, 
Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and 
the Great Powers 1878-1888, and Roderic 
H. Davison’s works, particularly Nineteenth 
Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms. 
However, these books all ignore how gen-
der, in this case hegemonic masculinity, 
affected nineteenth-century diplomacy. 
This article adopts R.W. Connell’s argu-
ment for multiple simultaneously existing 
masculinities, with a hegemonic masculin-
ity (Connell 77). Few men will ever achieve 
this status, but because of their influence, 
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it determines the most honored way of 
being a man within its historical context 
(Connell and Messerschmidt 832). Unlike 
the above-mentioned books, Ali Bilgiç’s 
Power and the West: Gendered 
International Relations and Foreign Policy 
examines gender, interrogating how Great 
Powers have feminized or hypermasculin-
ized Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, 
prompting Turkish and Ottoman leaders 
to embrace Westernization programs and 
promote their state as properly civilized 
and masculine (Bilgiç, “Introduction” 73); 
however, Bilgiç’s research begins in 1895 
and does not discuss the time period of 
this article. 
This article, in addition to analyzing the 
diplomatic correspondence of the 
Ottoman and British foreign ministries, will 
examine satirical journals published in 
Istanbul and London. These journals will 
demonstrate that the satirical press in both 
empires had a shared conception of hege-
monic masculinity. Furthermore, examin-
ing these journals is critical because this 
was the first major European war where 
the public received daily updates of the 
war (İşçi 188; Davison, “Advent” 155). This 
is necessary as both Ottoman and British 
officials regularly cited public opinion in 
defense of their actions. The importance 
of masculinity during this time might not 
be readily apparent, as officially recog-
nized diplomacy was nearly the exclusive 
purview of men. But how masculinity was 
manifested in Ottoman and Great Power 
diplomacy during this specific time period 
had a direct influence on decision-makers’ 
policies. 
From 1875-1878, the dominant concerns of 
the international system were the mainte-
nance of the balance of power and the 
spread of civilization. While the Great 
Powers had agreed following the Crimean 
War that the survival of the Ottoman 
Empire was necessary to maintain the bal-
ance, it was conditional on the Ottomans 
instituting administrative reforms to ame-
liorate its military, finances, and the rights 
of its Christian subjects. The crisis threat-
ened to alienate the Ottoman Empire from 
the Great Powers, including its closest ally, 
England. Consequently, throughout the 
crisis Ottoman officials sought to convince 
the cabinets of the Great Powers that the 
Ottoman Empire was still essential to the 
balance of power and that the Ottomans 
were civilized. The latter was especially 
important, as barbarous powers could be 
a legitimate target for Great Power inter-
vention or imperialism. Because European 
conceptions of civilization and barbarity 
were heavily gendered – traits associated 
with civilization were gendered as mascu-
line and those of barbarity as feminine – 
Ottoman diplomacy was also gendered, 
seeking to show that the Ottoman state 
and its officials were properly masculine 
and civilized.
The individuals who made up the govern-
ments of the Great Powers and the 
Ottoman Empire desired the survival of 
their states, but above all, they desired the 
maintenance of their honor, indepen-
dence, and sovereignty, which necessi-
tated positioning the state as properly 
masculine. In Europe, this construction 
utilized hierarchies of race, religion, class, 
and states, all of which they viewed as 
proof of their civilized nature and thus the 
right and obligation to rule lesser men 
and all women of the world (Parpart and 
Zalewski, “Introduction” 11). Ottoman offi-
cials did not challenge the European hier-
archical view of masculinity. Instead, they 
argued that Ottoman elites as well as the 
Ottoman Empire belonged to the premier 
class of men and states. Throughout the 
crisis, Ottoman and Great Power officials 
used masculinity to explain and defend 
their actions, appealing to honor and dig-
nity and claiming an ability to rationally 
direct or restrain the violence of men 
underneath their rule. 
Honor among Ottomans
In Stanley Lane-Poole’s biography of 
Stratford Canning, the British ambassador 
to the Ottoman Empire from 1842-58, he 
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quoted a conversation between Canning 
and Mustafa Reşid Pasha in London while 
Reşid was the Ottoman ambassador to 
England. Reşid asked Canning where the 
Ottoman Empire should start its reforms, 
to which Canning replied:
‘At the beginning.’ ‘What do you mean by 
the beginning?’ he said. ‘Security of life 
and property, of course,’ I rejoined. ‘Would 
not you add the protection of honour?’ he 
asked. ‘No doubt,’ I said. But in truth I won-
dered what he meant by honour among 
Turks, until I recollected their practice of 
applying the bastinado without discrimi-
nation to persons of any class or rank 
whatever.’ (Lane-Poole 105). 
The meaning of honor can be nebulous 
and changed over time within the 
Ottoman world. Examining honor in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
Leslie Pierce argues that Ottoman sultans 
abducting the dependents of political 
rivals improved the reputation of the state 
while also serving as the strongest attack 
on the honor of their enemies, but by the 
seventeenth century Ottomans viewed 
abductions as a potential threat to the 
state (Pierce 313). This shift coincided with 
Ottoman sultans no longer going out on 
campaign, risking defeat and loss of 
honor. Instead, they would command one 
of their pashas to lead in their place, as 
they could be publicly humiliated for any 
defeats without threatening the Sultan’s 
honor (Pierce 320, 324). Başak Tuğ argues 
that by the eighteenth century, both the 
Ottoman state and its subjects viewed 
upholding Ottomans’ honor as a central 
duty of the government in providing jus-
tice and a key legitimating factor for the 
Sultan, shown by the frequent references 
to honor in correspondence between the 
government and Ottoman subjects (Tuğ 
2). In 1839, at the behest of Reşid – who 
was now Grand Vizier – Sultan Abdülmecid 
promulgated the Tanzimat Reform Edict, 
which called for the protection of all sub-
jects’ life, liberty, honor, and property, 
codifying the state’s duty to protect its 
subjects’ honor. Importantly for elite men 
like Reşid, this would also require the 
Sultan to respect their honor as well as 
their lives and property, rather than be 
valid scapegoats or subject to the Sultan’s 
whims (Hanioğlu 73).
Ottoman reformers, like Reşid, believed in 
the necessity of these reforms to 
strengthen the Empire, but Ottoman 
reforms cannot be entirely separated from 
Ottoman diplomacy. Ottoman diplomats 
promised that these reforms would 
improve the condition of Ottoman 
Christians in hopes of gaining European 
alliances against external threats, entan-
gling Ottoman domestic and foreign pol-
icy. Likewise, upholding honor became 
not only a domestic concern but a foreign 
one as well. In Europe, modern notions of 
new political rights and civic honor greatly 
influenced the European diplomatic 
norms the Ottomans accepted. Personal 
honor retained value, but equal dignity 
had replaced positional honor, as men 
were now citizens with a theoretically 
equal status (LaVaque-Manty 715). 
Similarly, European states were acknowl-
edging one another’s sovereignty, accept-
ing parity between European states, and 
viewing diplomatic practices – such as 
kneeling – that implied subservience as 
feminine and thus undignified, dishonor-
able, and barbarous (Frevert 141). 
Just as not all men (and no women) yet 
had equal status despite the rhetoric, the 
same was true of states. To be accorded 
equal dignity and honor, the state had to 
also be viewed in Europe as a civilized 
power and thus worthy of international 
legal and Westphalian sovereignty, which 
granted international recognition of their 
territory and the exclusion of external 
actors in their internal affairs (Krasner 3-4, 
16-20). In practice, few non-European 
states ever attained this recognition and 
were instead characterized as barbarous 
or uncivilized (Keene 5-7). These labels 
were gendered, with civilization being 
associated with masculine virtues such as 
safe, rational, orderly, modern, and secu-
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lar, while barbaric states were connected 
to feminine vices such as dangerous, reac-
tionary, chaotic, backwards, and fanatical 
(Bilgiç “Reproduction of Power 
Hierarchies” 607, 888). Ottoman foreign 
policy was thus designed to construct an 
image of the Ottoman Empire as a civi-
lized and properly masculine state, whose 
international and Westphalian sovereignty 
would be recognized.
The Great Eastern Crisis of 1875-78 started 
in the town of Nevesinje in Herzegovina 
in the summer of 1875 and the rebellion 
quickly spread to neighboring Bosnia. 
Although the Porte argued that the rebel-
lion was strictly an internal Ottoman affair, 
Austria-Hungary and Russia developed a 
plan to submit to the Porte for pacification 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sultan 
Abdülaziz replied that he wished to intro-
duce governmental reforms which were 
compatible with his sovereignty, but he 
could not accept any foreign proposals, 
as “this would be committing suicide, and 
I prefer to die on my throne” (Foreign 
Office, 424:39, 327). Musurus Pasha, the 
Ottoman ambassador to London, made a 
similar argument to Lord Derby, the British 
Foreign Secretary. Speaking of Gyula 
Andrássy, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Minister, Musurus told Derby that 
Mehmed Raşid Pasha, the Ottoman 
Foreign Minister, was concerned that 
Andrássy’s proposal would not conform 
to the Great Powers’ treaties respecting 
the independence of the Ottoman Empire 
nor the Sultan’s dignity. 
The Porte would accept friendly advice 
from the Great Powers but argued that 
they should give their advice to the Porte 
in an unofficial manner so that it would not 
imply the Porte was subservient (Kuneralp 
and Tokay, “The Eastern Question” VII, 183-
4). Mahmud Nedim Pasha, the Grand 
Vizier, informed Sir Henry Elliot, the British 
ambassador, that if the ambassadors of 
the Great Powers insisted on presenting 
the Andrássy Note in an official manner, 
“he would not be the medium of laying 
upon His Majesty the affront which would 
be implied by the communication of a 
concerted official note” (Foreign Office, 
424:40, 49). 
All of the Great Powers save for Great 
Britain agreed to the terms of the Andrássy 
Note, however, and the Porte signaled that 
it would not make any more objections to 
the plan so long as it did not contain any-
thing prejudicial to Ottoman sovereignty 
or “calculated to wound the national feel-
ing” (Foreign Office, 424:40, 54-5). Finally, 
on January 31, 1876, the ambassadors of 
Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia 
presented the Andrássy Note to the Porte, 
and on February 13th Abdülaziz issued a 
ferman (edict) accepting four of the note’s 
five points (Kuneralp and Tokay, “The 
Eastern Question” VII, 275). The Porte’s pri-
mary concern had not been the terms of 
the note, but how the Great Powers 
intended to present it. To meekly accept 
an official note of proposed reforms from 
foreign governments, no matter how 
friendly, would broadcast submissiveness 
and a lack of manliness, inviting further 
European interventions and abrogating 
Ottoman sovereignty. 
During the crisis, Ottoman elites demon-
strated their belief that they were honor-
able, civilized, masculine, and had the 
right to sovereignty (Hooper 65; Kent 
238). Ottoman diplomatic rhetoric during 
this stage of the crisis is illustrative of what 
they meant by honor. They were not 
opposed to advice from representatives 
of the Great Powers; in fact, they wel-
comed it, seeking to create a modern 
empire with a strong government mod-
eled on the Great Powers, though adapted 
for Ottoman specificities. But they saw it as 
contradictory to modern diplomatic 
norms to accept official notes castigating 
Ottoman governance and demands of 
specific reforms – they viewed this as a 
denial of their status as an independent 
state. This was also recognition of their 
own relative weakness compared to the 
Great Powers. As Scott Taylor argues, 
“honor creates the polite fiction of auton-
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omy for those who are, in truth, subordi-
nate, and allows both the dominant and 
subordinate to accept that this state of 
affairs is just” (306). The Porte could accept 
their lesser status so long as the other 
powers acknowledged them as a civilized 
and masculine state, ineligible for their 
imperialism.
The Rational Use of Violence and 
Hegemonic Masculinity
Despite accepting the Andrássy Note, the 
rebellion in Bosnia and Herzegovina con-
tinued and spread to the vilâyets (prov-
inces) of Edirne and the Danube (often 
referred to collectively as Bulgaria). Local 
Ottoman leaders enrolled başıbozuks 
(irregular soldiers) to put down the rebel-
lion. British newspapers focused on sensa-
tionalized (and often fictional) reports of 
başıbozuks killing women and children or 
seizing them for their harems. The British 
public believed that only the most barba-
rous of peoples mistreated women (Kent 
164), and these reports were proof that 
Ottomans were not civilized. The Ottomans 
thus feared the reaction of the British pub-
lic meant that the English government 
would not come to their aid if Russia 
declared war.
Ottoman officials and satirists would go 
on the offensive, accusing their enemies 
of being barbarians and child-like; they 
were not proper men. Ali Bilgiç’s classifi-
cation is useful here, dividing this into 
three major groups: hypermasculine, 
masculine, and feminine. If they were 
brave and fighters, they were hypermas-
culinized and thus barbarous; if they 
were cowards, they were feminine, who 
needed Ottoman protection. But either 
way, they were not the right kind of mas-
culine: that is brave, rational, strong, and 
honorable. The Porte was also defensive, 
denying the truth of European reports on 
the massacres. Seeking recognition as a 
civilized power, the Porte could no lon-
ger condone the mistreatment of its 
Christian subjects. Thus, during the 
Greek War of Independence in the 1820s, 
an Ottoman irregular, Deli Mustafa, 
could boast of beheading infidels, pil-
laging Greek villages, and seizing Greek 
women and children to rape and enslave, 
all with the knowledge and participation 
of the Ottoman imperial army (Esmer 
3-5). In 1876, however, the Porte could 
not allow such hypermasculine and bar-
barous acts while also defending itself as 
a civilized power. 
Alexander Gorchakov, the Russian Foreign 
Minister, informed the Ottoman ambassa-
dor, Kabulî Pasha, that because Russia’s 
honor was engaged, it could not ignore 
further Ottoman Christian deaths 
(Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern 
Question” VII, 344-346). Nor would the 
principalities of Serbia and Montenegro 
– both nominally Ottoman provinces – who 
declared war on the Ottomans on July 
2nd. Although Montenegro fared well in 
its battles, Serbia did not. The difference in 
how Ottomans depicted the two principal-
ities is telling. Ottoman diplomats com-
plained about Montenegrins mutilating 
Fig. 1: Prince Milan of Serbia on a Cannon.  
Source: Hayâl. 
Caption: “Oh God, the Tsarist is sitting on the can-
non, he will probably fly off the handle at this rate.” 
[Yâhû Çarcı ṭopa oṭurmuş galiba bu gidişle küpe 
binecek.]1
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captured and wounded Ottoman soldiers, 
cutting off their noses and part of their 
upper lips. They did not discredit their 
martial abilities or bravery – both typically 
markers of masculinity – but instead 
depicted them as hypermasculine sav-
ages, who were not civilized enough to 
rule themselves. Although at times 
Ottomans also depicted Serbia as out of 
control and bloodthirsty (figures 1 and 2), 
it was more common for them to show 
Prince Milan and Serbia as a feminized 
child, essentially playing at war (figure 3). 
Therefore, neither Montenegrins nor 
Serbians combined the bravery, martial 
abilities, and the rational deployment of 
violence of civilized men who culd rule 
themselves.
By August, the Great Powers were asking 
the Porte to agree to peace with the prin-
cipalities based on the status quo ante. 
The new Grand Vizier, Mehmed Rüşdi 
Pasha, argued that despite greatly desir-
ing peace, the Porte could not agree to it 
before Ottoman forces had won a large 
enough victory to satisfy the nation’s 
desire to see Serbia punished, alluding to 
Serbia as a wayward child in need of dis-
cipline. Safvet Pasha, again the Foreign 
Minister, argued that the request for peace 
should come directly from Milan in order 
to flatter the amour-propre of Ottomans 
(Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern 
Question” VIII, 146). 
In September, the Great Powers insisted 
on an armistice with the principalities as 
well as elaborating new administrative 
reforms for Bosnia, Herzegovina, and 
Bulgaria. Safvet complained bitterly about 
this, stating that, “if the Sublime Porte 
could forget that it is an independent State 
that has been victorious…it would not for-
get that it is still an independent state and 
that it must prefer an honorable death to 
dismemberment” (Kuneralp and Tokay, 
“The Eastern Question” VIII, 272-273). 
Mehmed Rüşdi also argued that an inter-
national conference discussing internal 
Fig. 2: Prince Milan on His Trone. Source: Hayâl.
Caption: “Is it not the desired kingdom? If it is not Serbia, let it be a graveyard.” [Murâd ḳrallık değil mi? 
Ṣırbistan olmaz ise ḳabristân olsun.]
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Ottoman affairs would diminish the 
Sultan’s prestige in his European prov-
inces (Foreign Office, 424:45, 160). On 
October 21st, Punch succinctly depicted 
the attitude of the Great Powers. The 
Ottoman Empire, depicted as a sick and 
feeble old man, is propped up in a chair 
holding a large pill labeled Armistice while 
men representing each of the Great 
Powers tell him that he must take it at once 
or they are not sure what will happen (fig-
ure 4). With all the Great Powers in agree-
ment on holding a conference to discuss 
reestablishment of peace and new 
reforms, the Porte acquiesced in hopes it 
could preserve all its sovereign rights 
(Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern 
Question” VIII, 408-409). 
At the same time, Midhat Pasha’s commit-
tee was seeking to complete its draft of an 
Ottoman constitution, hoping its pro-
posed reforms would satisfy the Great 
Fig. 4: The Great Powers Attempt to Force an Armistice on the Ottoman Empire. Source: Punch.
Caption: “A Pill in Time!”
Fig. 3: A Serbian Child Wants to Fight the Ottomans. 
Source: Çaylaḳ. 
Caption: “Child: ‘Granny, can I also go out with my 
sword like my father Milan?’
Grandmother: ‘You will go out, my child, but you 
are too young. You need to grow up a little bit; your 
father also was only 15-years old when he had gone 
out.’”
[Çocuḳ – Nine ben de babam Milan gibi Türklerin 
ḳarşısında ḳılıç ile çıḳarabiliyor muyum?
Validesi – Çıḳarsıñ evlâdım ama daha küçüğüñ. 
Biraz büyümesiñ babañ da on beş yaşında çıḳmış 
idi.]
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Powers before the Constantinople 
Conference began in Istanbul. 
Nevertheless, Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatyev, 
the Russian ambassador, warned Safvet 
not only that they would not accept the 
Constitution in lieu of their proposals, the 
plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers 
would consider its promulgation an insult 
(Foreign Office, 424:46, 200). However, at 
the start of the first meeting on December 
23rd, Safvet announced that Sultan 
Abdülhamid II had just promulgated the 
Constitution. The plenipotentiaries of the 
Great Powers ignored this proclamation 
and asked for a response to their propos-
als at the next session. While Ottoman offi-
cials felt that they were elite men with the 
same status as statesmen of the other 
great and civilized European empires, the 
latter viewed the Ottomans as children, in 
need of their supervision, much as the 
Ottomans viewed Serbians and Bulgarians 
(figures 5, 6, and 7). The Porte did not chal-
lenge the legitimacy of imperialism or 
colonialism, only what position they held 
within this hierarchy. So while they were 
not yet as explicitly colonialist in seeking 
to civilize Ottoman subjects as they would 
be in following decades (Deringil 312), 
they used gendered colonialist tropes – 
such as Midhat arguing that Bulgarians 
were not intelligent enough to rule them-
selves (Midhat 990) – to justify their impe-
rialism over peoples they viewed as hyper-
masculine (Montenegrins and Circassians) 
or too feminine and in need of their pro-
tection (Bulgarians and Serbian). 
At the final meeting of the Constantinople 
Conference on January 20, 1877, the 
Ottoman plenipotentiaries – Safvet and 
Edhem Pasha – rejected two of the pro-
posals as incompatible with Ottoman 
honor and sovereignty: that the Porte 
obtain prior approval before appointing 
vâlîs (governors) for Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
and Bulgaria and the formation of an inter-
national commission to oversee execution 
of reforms. Gorchakov took the Ottomans’ 
refusal as an affront to Europe, telling the 
British ambassador, Lord Augustus Loftus, 
that “he had a very red [mark] on him, for 
we all have received a snub” and Europe 
Fig. 5: The Great Powers Rebuke the Ottomans for Disturbing Europe. Source: Punch.
Caption: “Dame Europa’s Christmas Pudding.” 
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needed to defend its honor (Foreign 
Office, 424:48, 213). Conversely, Lord Odo 
Russell, the British ambassador to 
Germany, told Otto von Bismarck that he 
believed the Porte’s refusal showed the 
strength of the Ottomans and the weak-
ness of Russia. Bismarck agreed, but 
warned that Russia’s failure would humili-
ate it and drive it to restore its honor in a 
war that could engulf much of Europe 
(Foreign Office, 424:48, 17-173). 
Before Russia declared war, Count Pyotr 
Andreyevich Shuvalov, the Russian ambas-
sador to London, informed Musurus that if 
the Porte concluded peace with 
Montenegro, showed serious progress in 
instituting reforms, and sent a special 
ambassador to meet with Czar Alexander 
II to discuss simultaneous demobilization, 
the Czar would accept this overture as he 
could then do so honorably (Kuneralp and 
Tokay, “The Eastern Question” IX, 100-102). 
Nevertheless, the Porte refused to send 
any ambassador (Foreign Office, 424:51, 
121). Moreover, although it was not 
required to sign the London Protocol as 
the Great Powers had, on April 9th the 
Porte publicly rejected its terms as a humil-
iating demand of an independent and 
civilized power “without example in his-
tory” (Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern 
Question” IX, 188-193). Musurus informed 
Derby that the contents were so deroga-
tory to the Sultan’s honor and indepen-
dence that it would be better for the 
Ottoman Empire to face the consequences 
of an unsuccessful war against Russia than 
quietly acquiescing to this protocol 
(Foreign Office, 424:51, 65). The Porte 
would not even condescend to sending a 
special ambassador to the Czar, believing 
it would be undignified and unmanly of 
the Sultan to make the first overture for 
peace.
Austen Henry Layard, the new British 
ambassador to the Porte, arrived in 
Istanbul with the goal of maintaining 
peace between Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire. Both the Sultan and the new 
Grand Vizier, Edhem, assured the ambas-
sador of their desire for peace. Edhem 
promised that, “I would do my utmost to 
preserve the lives of the tens of thousands 
of inoffensive, innocent Mussulmans… It 
could only be a profound conviction that 
the honour and independence of my 
country are at stake which could make me 
hesitate” (Foreign Office, 424:53, 72-75). 
In a private meeting, Abdülhamid made a 
similar argument to Layard, who 
responded that Ottoman diplomacy had 
Fig. 6: Europe Admonishes the Ottomans.  
Source: Hayâl.
Caption: “What? Now that you learned to walk 
too, you want to go out…? But if you go out, I will 
break your legs.” [Ne? Artıḳ yürümek öğrendiñ de 
çıḳmaḳ mı istiyorsuñ? ...Çıkarsıñ ama seniñ ayaḳlarıñı 
ḳırarım.]
Fig. 7: The Ottomans Reject Europe’s Tutelage. Sourc: 
Hayâl.
Caption: “Do you really want to find out that I have 
learned to walk?...” [Yürümek öğreñmiş olduğumu 
añlamaḳ istersiñ öyle mi?...]
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already demonstrated ample proofs of the 
government’s courage, and it could no 
longer claim that assenting to Great Power 
demands now would damage its dignity 
or independence (Foreign Office, 424:53, 
76-78). 
Before the Ottoman government sus-
pended the satirical press, Ottoman dip-
lomatic rhetoric and satire on Russia mir-
rored that on Serbia and Montenegro 
previously. Ottoman officials focused on 
Russian war crimes, particularly against 
Ottoman women and children, and 
accused Russia of being driven by reli-
gious zealotry. Similarly, Ottoman political 
cartoons typically depicted Russia as a 
savage bear, or a wild-looking soldier cov-
ered in weapons, while Ottomans were 
shown as easily defeating Russians and 
protecting cowardly and child-like 
Ottoman Christians (figures 8 and 9). In 
short, Ottomans reversed the gendered 
anti-Ottoman attacks that accused them of 
being barbarous, religious fanatics and 
redirected these charges against Russia. 
Despite a stronger-than-expected resis-
tance at Pleven in Bulgaria, on December 
10th, Ottoman forces led by Osman Pasha 
capitulated to the Russian siege. After 
signing the Treaty of San Stefano in March, 
the other Great Powers insisted on a con-
gress to reach a new agreement, which 
would replace the terms of San Stefano. In 
July, they and the Ottoman Empire agreed 
to the Treaty of Berlin. As Ottoman officials 
had promised throughout the crisis, they 
accepted a disastrous war and the loss of 
great swaths of territory in both Europe 
and Asia. Ottoman officials had not 
deluded themselves on their chances of 
victory before the war; they accepted war 
because they would not accept the humil-
iation of submitting to foreign interference 
without a fight, thereby impugning their 
dignity and right to sovereignty. 
Conclusion
Throughout the crisis, Ottoman officials 
argued that foreign intervention in 
Ottoman affairs was a direct violation of 
the Treaty of Paris and quiet acceptance of 
this would be acquiescence to the abro-
gation of the treaty and their indepen-
Fig. 8: Circassians Beat Russian Soldiers. Source: Çaylaḳ.
Caption: “A type of game of strength of the brave Circassians.” [Çerkes dilâverlerinin bir nevʿ ḳuvvet oyuncağı]
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dence and autonomy. Consequently, they 
rejected any Great Power proposals that 
even implied European supervision or 
intervention in internal Ottoman affairs. In 
Ottoman diplomacy and satirical journals, 
Ottomans depicted themselves as civi-
lized and masculine, deserving of their 
independence. Furthermore, they por-
trayed their rebellious Christian subjects 
as hypermasculinized or feminized, and so 
barbarous and still in need of Ottoman 
tutelage. This rhetoric mirrored that of 
Europe’s, particularly Russia’s, regarding 
the Ottomans themselves. Thus, the 
Ottomans, like the governments and pub-
lic of the Great Powers, saw masculinity as 
both a marker of civilized status and legit-
imation for imperialism. 
 Finally, the Ottomans encouraged a war 
they knew they could not win rather than 
accept European arguments that they 
were neither civilized nor masculine 
enough to rule the Empire unsupervised. 
Similarly, Russia risked provoking Great 
Britain to war over perceived insults to its 
honor – a war it promised the Ottomans 
they could avoid if they humbled them-
selves to satisfy the Czar’s honor. The pri-
mary difference, therefore, between the 
Ottomans and Great Powers was not the 
importance the former attached to honor 
or even its definition of honor; nor was it 
that Ottoman officials disputed a hierarchy 
of masculinities. The difference was that 
Ottomans believed that the Ottoman 
Empire was civilized, and they therefore 
had the right to rule over barbaric peoples 
of their Empire. Great Powers officials, 
however, viewed the Ottomans as 
semi-barbarous at best; they could retain 
what remained of their Empire only so 
long as they accepted European tutelage 
and because the balance of power still 
demanded it.
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Fig. 9: An Ottoman Man Unafraid of the Unleashed Russian Bear. Source: Hayâl.
Caption: “Do not be afraid children…! As he sees the bayonet, he will be foxlike, you will see!
[Ḳorḳmayañız çocuḳlar!… Süngüyü gördüğü gibi tilkileşir açılıñız da görsün!]
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